Monthly Archives: April 2012
Davis Defendants and District of Columbia Contend Appeal Is Appropriate Under Collateral Order Doctrine
Both the Davis defendants and the District of Columbia today filed oppositions to the motion to dismiss their appeals filed by 3M earlier this month. As you might expect, both argue that the appeal is appropriate under the collateral order doctrine. The Davis defendants first directly contest 3M’s position that the decision could be reviewed after the case was over. Pointing to numerous decisions holding that anti-SLAPP statutes provide immunity from suit from meritless suits, they argue that 3M’s position, if accepted, would force defendants to shoulder the burden of meritless lawsuits through discovery and, perhaps, trial – which is exactly …
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Maddow and NBC Move to Dismiss Second Dean Suit
Rachel Maddow and related NBC defendants today moved to dismiss the duplicative federal court suit filed by Dean and others. This second anti-SLAPP motion, necessitated because Dean is forum shopping in federal court instead of litigating his pending case in Superior Court, makes many of the arguments previously made by the defendants in the Superior Court action. Because the case is now pending in federal court, however, and in light of the opinion in 3M v. Boulter, the defendants argue that the anti-SLAPP statute clearly applies in federal court. They quote from Judge Leon’s “Statement of Reasons” in Sherrod v. …
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3M Moves to Dismiss Davis Appeal of Denial of Anti-SLAPP Motion to DC Circuit
Today, 3M moved to dismiss the appeal filed by the Davis defendants. In its motion, 3M argues that the appeal of the district court’s opinion and order, denying the anti-SLAPP motion filed by the Davis defendants, must be dismissed because: (a) the district court’s order was not a final order within meaning of § 1291; (b) the district court’s order is not the type of § 1292 order from which an interlocutory appeal can be taken; (c) the Davis defendants did not obtain permission from the district court to certify the order for appeal; and (d) the order does not …
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